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 China’s anti-schistosomiasis campaign was once viewed as a model for the 
developing world.  The parasitic disease, commonly known as snail fever, was endemic 
throughout much of southern China at the time of that country’s 1949 Communist 
Revolution, infecting more than 10 million people and putting 100 million more at risk.  
After learning that schistosomiasis had been eradicated in Yujiang County, Mao Zedong 
wrote a celebrated poem in 1958 entitled “Farewell to the God of Plague,” marking not 
just China’s victory over snail fever, but that of “science” over “backwardness.”  Joshua 
Horn’s Away with All Pests (1969), a first-hand account of Chinese healthcare, praised 
the Maoist approach for its effectiveness and low cost, and the campaign’s reputed 
success was a major influence on the World Health Organization’s Alma-Alta 
Declaration of 1978.  However, by the 1980s, the enthusiasm which had greeted the 
Chinese model had subsided.  Once it became clear that government statistics from the 
era were inflated, claims that “barefoot doctors” were capable of conducting medical 
miracles no longer seemed credible.  Like the wider twentieth century socialist movement 
of which it was a part, China’s campaign to eradicate snail fever appeared to have 
promised far more than it delivered.     
Miriam Gross, an assistant professor in Chinese history and area studies at the 
University of Oklahoma, has written the first monograph on the Maoist healthcare model 
since the late 1970s.  Employing newly available archival materials from Shanghai, 
Jiangxi, and Jiangsu, Gross uncovers that while snail fever was never completely 
eradicated, 95% of the infected population had been cured by 1981.  She attributes this 
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success to advances in treatment, and downplays the importance of widely promoted 
prevention efforts.  By doing so, Gross upends established scholarly and popular 
understandings of China’s snail fever campaign.  It turns out that the campaign was more 
effective than thought, albeit for reasons different than the ones commonly given.       
Also provocative are the author’s findings related to “science.”  Even though Mao 
and other radicals were dismantling China’s scientific bureaucracy during the Great Leap 
Forward (1958-61) and Cultural Revolution (1966-76), “grassroots science” remained a 
central feature of the Maoist era.  Grassroots science differed from normative science in 
that it arose from problem solving rather than tests with control groups.  Nonetheless, it 
did employ scientific tools such as statistics, mapping, and data analysis, which allowed 
young activists to conduct planning and – with the help of medical experts – combat the 
disease.  Gross persuasively reads the anti-schistosomiasis campaign as part of a wider 
trend of “scientific consolidation” through which the Communists secured their rule.   
Chapter 1 covers the snail fever campaign at the elite level.  Most Chinese 
political leaders did not feel that schistosomiasis was a pressing issue until late 1955 
when Mao announced the goal to eradicate the disease within seven years.  Gross traces 
this change to the turn in the countryside from lower-level cooperatives to advanced 
producer cooperatives and later communes.  These multi-village sites had resources for 
healthcare and could mandate mass participation in prevention campaigns in return for 
work points.  Also influential was the advice of Yoshitaka Komiya from the Japanese 
Society of Parasitology, who in 1956 argued that labor-intensive methods such as snail 
elimination were the best way for Chinese to tackle the disease.  Still, despite Mao’s 
backing, the campaign did not take off until 1957-58, and again in 1966-71, times when 
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large numbers of urban medical personnel were sent to the countryside for “reeducation.”  
In light of the publicity accrued to barefoot doctors, Gross’ discovery that medical 
experts played a central role in the anti-schistosomiasis campaign is an important finding.       
Chapters 2 and 3 examine structural constraints affecting the campaigns.  Aside 
from bureaucratic infighting, the biggest hindrance to participation was lack of economic 
incentive.  Local cadres believed that diverting villagers from fieldwork to engage in 
“bizarre” activities such as suffocating snails was a waste of resources.  Villagers were 
equally skeptical.  Treatment in the 1950s required 40 days’ rest in a community hospital, 
during which time they were deprived of earning work points.  Making matters worse, 
fees were the equivalent of a month’s salary, so patients were in fact double-charged.  
Treatment was not made free until the start of the Cultural Revolution.  Ironically, it was 
during a period retrospectively described as “ten years of chaos” that the anti-
schistosomiasis campaign was most effective.   
 One reason why villagers and local cadres were unwilling to commit to 
prevention work or treatment was because they saw no correlation between snails and 
snail fever.  Traditionally, illness was seen as reflecting internal imbalances or the work 
of vengeful spirits.  Chapter 4 details Party attempts at educating villagers to the real 
causes of the disease.  Given that much of the rural population was illiterate, the Party 
relied on oral and visual methods to spread its message.  Plays and films were 
emotionally stirring, but they were unable to imprint an understanding of the methods by 
which snail fever was transmitted.  Illustrations fared no better; since they typically 
depicted sufferers with a distended belly, unaffected viewers deduced that the images 
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were not relevant.  Even asking villagers to peer at the parasite though microscopes was 
not convincing, as they lacked understandings of magnification and disease transmission.   
 Chapter 5 examines the campaign’s highly publicized efforts at prevention.  
Building dams or digging irrigation canals, while reducing the habitat in which snails 
could thrive, appeared to villagers as threatening the community’s feng shui.  When the 
disease returned after the cessation of prevention efforts during the Great Leap Forward 
famine, villagers took it as a sign that the Party’s “scientific” techniques rested on a 
faulty understanding of the world.  Rather than education, it was social pressure and 
appeals to patriotic sentiment that motivated people to participate in campaigns.   
 Chapter 6 looks at evolving treatment methods.  Medical advances reduced 
treatment time to three days, and then, during the Cultural Revolution, there appeared an 
oral treatment that could be taken at home.  Also important were changes in testing 
methods.  Stool tests, the dominant method in the 1950s, were viewed as invasive and 
embarrassing.  Villagers often evaded submitting samples, or turned in animal feces in 
lieu of their own.  The development in 1964 of a skin test that could be employed in rural 
areas overcame villagers’ hesitation and allowed for large-scale testing.  Treatment, not 
prevention, became the dominant means to combat snail fever.   
 Chapters 7 and 8 examine the manner in which the Party employed “science” to 
gain legitimacy.  Although the goal to develop cadres who were “red” and “expert” had 
been a state goal since the late 1950s, it was not until the Cultural Revolution that village 
youth possessed the skills to employ statistics, fill out forms and keep records, and carry 
out hands-on experiments.  This scientific toolkit, while rudimentary, marked a 
considerable advance in village thinking, enabling barefoot doctors to achieve a level of 
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success previously unobtainable.  Furthermore, with much of the established bureaucracy 
on unsure footing due to the Cultural Revolution, there was room for educated youth to 
assume positions of leadership in village campaigns.   
Still, success was not due to the efforts of barefoot doctors alone.  Just as 
important was the input of sent-down medical personnel.  During the first half of the 
Cultural Revolution, nearly all graduates of Chinese medical schools were assigned to 
work in rural hospitals.  In this manner, youth known by the local communities could 
wield their influence, while also benefiting from the advice of experts.  Nearly two 
decades after the Communist revolution, “scientific thinking” had become integrated into 
the basic work process and reflected a “common sense” approach to problem solving.  At 
the same time, by promoting a science-based rhetoric while dismantling urban scientific 
institutions and criticizing “superstitious” behavior, the Party presented itself as the 
ultimate arbiter of “truth,” undercutting room from which one could argue against state 
policies.  Although not mentioned by the author, the Chinese government’s uncontestable 
authority stands in contrast with the late Soviet model, where, as Ethan Pollock (Stalin 
and the Soviet Science Wars, 2006) has argued, “scientific truth” offered a way to 
discredit the regime.        
The conclusion touches upon developments after Mao’s death in 1976, when 
communes were dismantled, trained doctors returned home, and adequate health care in 
rural areas became unaffordable.  Given these changes, it is unclear why there was a brief 
spike in the snail fever campaign in the late 1970s.  Did that period also follow the 
Maoist health care model?  Gross here does not provide much detail.  In any case, 
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China’s Reform Era has seen an increase in schistosomiasis; roughly 100,000 more are 
infected today than in 1981.   
The conclusion also evaluates China’s snail fever campaign alongside the 
contemporaneous WHO campaign to eradicate malaria, as well as China’s 2003 
campaign against SARS.  However, considering the differences in political, cultural, and 
economic factors between the malaria and snail fever campaigns, I wonder if 
comparisons between the two are tenable.  I also see little that is “Maoist” in the SARS 
campaign other than social pressure to participate and reliance on state funding.  It would 
have been better if Gross had treated these comparisons to a more in-depth analysis, 
instead of only touching upon them in the conclusion.           
Minor qualms aside, it is clear that Gross has written an important work.  In 
addition to fundamentally revising our understanding of the priorities and effectiveness of 
China’s anti-schistosomiasis campaign, Farewell to the God of Plague is the first 
monograph to document how Chinese Communists employed science for political 
consolidation.  Her account of the push and pull between locals and officials likely offers 
insight into the processes by which other self-consciously “modernizing” regimes have 
attempted to bring “progress” to their inhabitants, and offers an illuminating example of 
Michel Foucault’s concept of biopower.  Health professionals, China experts, post-
colonial theorists, and historians of science will find much to ponder.  Perhaps it is time 
to again ask if the Maoist health model has relevance for the developing world.   
